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Globalization has made it possible for labor in developing countries to augment labor in the developed
world, without having to relocate, in ways not thought possible only a few decades ago. We argue
that this large increase in the developed world’s effective labor supply, triggered by geo-political events
and technological innovations, coupled with the inability of existing institutions in the US and developing
nations themselves to cope with this shock set the stage for the great recession. The financial crisis
in the US was but the first acute symptom.
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The global recession of 2007-9 was without a doubt the most severe since the great depression of
the 1930s. A large part of the wealth of US households evaporated: Household net worth in the
US (including nonproﬁt organizations) went from $42.1 trillion (4.4×GDP) in 1999 to $51.7 trillion
(3.6×GDP) in 2008 while the consumer price index (CPI) increased by 29%, and the number of
households in the US increased to 117 million from 104 million.1 As a result, the net worth per
household in real terms (1999 dollars) declined sharply from $402,000 to $343,000, a 15% drop. The
unemployment rate captures the diﬃcult times of the average citizen even better: it went up from
4.4% in 1999 to 7.2% in 2008 – and peaked at 10.1% in October 2009, even as discouraged workers
increasingly dropped out of the workforce and no longer counted in the unemployment statistics.
In what follows we provide an explanation for a recession of this magnitude. We make the
case that a huge and rapid increase in the developed world’s eﬀective labor supply, triggered by
the globalization of emerging economies in conjunction with innovations in information technology
and transportation, is the major underlying force that is aﬀecting world economic events today.
In essence, the productive citizens of less developed countries have eﬀectively joined the workforce
of developed countries in increasing numbers, without the need to change their citizenship or
relocate. The global macroeconomic adjustments required to absorb this massive labor supply
shock and return the world economy to its new long term equilibrium are still taking place. The
global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-9 and the ensuing great recession can be viewed as side-eﬀects of this
adjustment process caused by the inability of existing ﬁnancial and legal institutions in the US and
abroad to cope with the events set oﬀ by this force: The inability of emerging economies to absorb
savings through domestic investment and consumption due to inadequate national ﬁnancial markets;
the inability of exchange rates to act as shock absorbers due to capital controls motivated by
immediate national objectives; the inability of the US economy to adjust to the perverse incentives
caused by huge moneys inﬂow leading to a breakdown of checks and balances at various ﬁnancial
institutions2.
Is seems clear that no single general equilibrium model can hope to adequately capture all the
ﬁrst order important strategic, ﬁnancial and open economy aspects necessary to study the roots of
the great recession.3 For this reason, we will resort to an informal model of the players in the global
economy as sketched in the diagram below. In particular, our analysis focuses squarely on the two
main actors, China and US households, whose growing economic and ﬁnancial interdependence has
been a key feature of global developments over the last two decades. Almost every arrow connecting
these two actors and their intermediaries in the diagram below has been examined in the recent
ﬁnance and international economics literatures. However, to our knowledge, this literature always
1Table F.100 of the Flow of Funds, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1r-3.pdf
2The evidence in Sussman & Yafeh (2011) is consistent with the view that macro global events played a major
role in precipitating the ﬁnancial crisis
3In typical equilibrium trade models that examine outsourcing, the poor country will be borrowing from the rich
country and running a current account deﬁcit whereas in fact China is one of the largest lenders to the US.
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focusing exclusively on a few individual linkages and not the complete picture. The contribution of
this paper is therefore to put together the many individual insights from these distinct literatures
to tell a coherent story of why the ﬁnancial crisis arose in the way it did, when it did and where





























Figure 1: Our simpliﬁed model of the events leading up to the crisis of 2007-9.
In our starkly simpliﬁed model of the world leading up to the crisis of 2007-9 (sketched in Figure
1), we trace the genesis of the global macroeconomic imbalances back to a huge labor supply increase
associated with the gradual opening up of China in the decades following the normalization of
relations with the US in 1979.4 In a nutshell, China pursued an export led growth strategy based
on attracting foreign direct investment and technology in return for foreign ﬁrms’ access to low
cost labor (the lower left set of arrows), as explained by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau & Garber (2007).
The Chinese labor cost advantage (in USD terms) is maintained through tight control of domestic
wage inﬂation and a low USD/RMB exchange rate peg enforced through a system of tight capital
controls. The period of high FDI inﬂows during the initial development of China’s export sector
is followed by an extended period of large Chinese current account surpluses as the transfer of
know-how is completed and homegrown exporters appear. The Chinese current account surplus is
matched by oﬀsetting fund inﬂows into US ﬁxed income markets, driving down interest rates (the
upper left sets of arrows). This pattern of capital ﬂows from the developing word to industrialized
countries has been described by some authors as the “Global Savings Glut”, and the causality
from excess savings abroad to lower US interest rates has been well studied in the literature (see,
for example Bernanke (2005)). One immediate beneﬁciary is the US government which is able
to roll-over the existing stock of government debt, expand services while taxing households less
and run up the deﬁcit without suﬀering higher interest rates (the top right set of arrows). The
4Although we focus our story on China (by far the larger shock), it should be noted that the fall of the Soviet
Union, which a decade later ended the cold war, helped the developing world as a whole focus more on economic
growth based on trade with the Western world.
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inﬂow of foreign capital directed at “risk-free” investments and investors “reaching for yield” also
puts downwards pressure on rates on close substitute AAA rated securities (the middle left set
of arrows). The excess demand for ultra safe ﬁxed income securities in turn leads to a spurt of
innovation in the ﬁnancial sector which engineers ever increasing amounts of AAA rated structured
products backed by mortgages and consumer credit (the middle right set of arrows). The ﬂow of
foreign capital is thus ultimately channeled into the US real estate market and cheap consumer
loans, giving the illusion of wealth and setting the stage for a housing price bubble. US households,
feeling wealthy in an environment with low taxes, expanded government services, cheap credit,
cheap consumption goods and seemingly ever increasing home prices, go on a consumption binge
and let the personal savings rate drop below 2% for the ﬁrst time since the Great Depression (lower
right set of arrows). A non-trivial portion of the US household consumption expenditure goes to
retail chains like Walmart and Home Depot and other ﬁrms which employ a large number of US
workers but (indirectly) an even larger number of Chinese workers in China’s export sector, thus
closing the circle. As long as China is able to control domestic wages and remains willing to ﬁnance
ever larger US deﬁcits on the cheap in return for technology transfer and increased employment,
this cycle can in principle go on in perpetuity. In the “textbook” treatment of persistent current
account imbalances and currency crises, however, the Chinese currency peg cannot be defended
indeﬁnitely and eventually “hot money” ﬂowing back into China in circumvention of the capital
controls will lead to high inﬂationary pressures and eventually force China to give up its peg, as
pointed out by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau & Garber (2007). This sequence of events has not played
out as of this writing. Instead the weaker link turned out to be US and global ﬁnancial markets
which turned out to be surprisingly vulnerable when the housing bubble ﬁnally burst.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy review the emergence
of China on the global economic scene and the associated changes in global capital ﬂows. In section
3 we discuss how housing price bubble that was created by foreign inﬂows led to a consumption
binge by US households due to the wealth eﬀect (a signiﬁcant fraction of which is spent on imports).
In Section 4 we provide further evidence linking the current account balance of the US and to the
funds ﬂow into the US mortgage market. We also discuss the role of ﬁnancial engineering by
summarizing the salient facts from the vast ﬁnancial crisis literature on distortion of incentives
and the failures of checks and balances that brought the world ﬁnancial system to its knees. In
Section 5 we argue that housing bubbles are diﬀerent than stock market bubbles in terms of their
real eﬀects on the economy. We conclude our analysis in Section 6 with our views on the future
adjustments still facing the US and lessons learned.
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2 The Emergence of China, Labor Supply Shock, Current Ac-
count Deﬁcit, and Capital Flows
China has arguably beneﬁted greatly from globalization and has emerged as one of the most
important creditor nations and trading partners of the US.5 In 1980, China accounted for less than
2% of world GDP. By 2007 this ﬁgure had grown to almost 6% (or 12% when adjusted for purchasing
power parity), making China the third largest economy on track to overtaking Japan as the second
largest economy by 2011.This meteoric rise is the result of a systematic policy of industrialization
and has been greatly facilitated by innovations in communications and transportation technology
that have brought the services of China’s enormous pool of underemployed labor on-line for western
consumers and corporations.
To put things in context, the size of the increase in the developed world’s eﬀective labor supply
is of a similar order of magnitude as the increase in the western world’s access to land and natural
resources following the discovery of the Americas. A shock of such a magnitude to the developed
world’s labor supply is likely to adversely aﬀect some and positively aﬀect others in the short run,
even if everyone hypothetically could be made better oﬀ in the long run. Those in the emerging
economies who now have new opportunities will ﬂourish. A signiﬁcant fraction of those in the
western world who remain employed will beneﬁt and see their wages go up while others will see
their jobs vanish. Although the wages of a signiﬁcant fraction of the population in the western world
could be adversely aﬀected in the short run, this eﬀect will be partially oﬀset by the availability of
cheaper consumption goods.
2.1 Labor Supply Shock, Local Employment, Wages, and Savings
Until 1979 China was entirely closed to foreign investors. Over the following 12 years, a series of
reforms initiated by Deng Xiaopeng gradually sought to bring China’s large masses of underem-
ployed labor into the manufacturing and industrial sectors of the world economy. This plan was
in no small measure made possible by recent innovations in transportation technology, such as the
standardization of container shipping in the early 1970’s, that made a vast variety of goods cost
eﬀective to ship around the world. Facing the limitations of domestic capital markets and the
lack of technological know-how to build up a home grown export sector, China’s initial strategy
depended on allowing foreign ﬁrms into a very limited number of sectors where domestic state
owned enterprises were not active or those where China wanted to acquire technological know-how
(see e.g. Graham & Wada (2002)). As seen from Figure 2, FDI ﬂows initially remained fairly
modest (less than 1% of GDP) until 1991.
In 1992, China devalued the Yuan by more than 30% and started undertaking a series of
far-reaching reforms with the objective of promoting new export industries. Foreign ﬁrms were
encouraged to take advantage of low cost (in dollar terms) Chinese labor by investing in the
5While China arguably beneﬁted the most from globalization, other emerging nations like, for example, Brazil
and India beneﬁted greatly as well.
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Figure 2: Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a fraction of China’s GDP, China’s real annual GDP growth
, and gross exports as a fraction of GDP. Source: World Bank WDI
export intensive manufacturing sectors.6 The access to low cost labor ensured the competitive
edge of the Chinese export sector, and virtually guaranteed foreign ﬁrms proﬁtability as a quid
pro quo for their capital accumulation and technology/skill transfer. Between 1992-1993, FDI
surged from a mere 1% of GDP to more than 6% of GDP, as seen in Figure 2, and remained
at more than 4% until after the onset of the crisis in 2008. The high level of FDI also set the
stage for the gradual increase in net exports from around 0% of GDP in the mid 1990s to almost
15% of GDP in 2007. The sharp appreciation of the Japanese Yen in the mid 90’s7 and the
setting up of excellent infrastructure facilities by the Chinese government speeded up the moving
of manufacturing operations by Japanese ﬁrms relying on US exports to China to take advantage
of low cost Chinese labor. 8
China’s export led growth boom has been successful in solving the problem of transferring a large
segment of the rural population to coastal cities and special economic zones at the rate of almost
20 million each year. The urban population in China increased by nearly 300 million from 1990 to
2007 and in the 12 years between 1995 and 2007 the share of the urban population more doubled
from less than 20% in 1995 to nearly 45% in 2007. A signiﬁcant part of those who migrated to
urban areas ultimately have become part of the developed world’s workforce through employment
6Relatively little FDI went into manufacturing targeted at the domestic sector with the exception of a few strategic
sectors, including automobiles and energy.
7The Yen appreciated by 33% between January 1994 to June 1995 and reached a high of 84 Yen/US$ in June
1995, putting severe pressure on the proﬁtability of Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms exporting to the US.
8Foreign ﬁrms in China remain tightly regulated and every eﬀort is made to avoid head-on competition with
domestic ﬁrms. Conditions of foreign ﬁrms may include where to locate, designation of local suppliers and operating
through a joint venture. A key goal of the FDI policy throughout the 1990s remained to gain access to foreign capital
as well as foreign technology, while limiting the competitive pressures on the domestic industry as pointed out in
Graham & Wada (2002).
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in industries exporting to the West.9 The reliance on domestic capital formation through FDI
and export led growth has served to circumvent the initial technology gap and the deﬁciencies of
domestic Chinese capital markets.10 Figure 4 shows that net exports and in particular investment
became an increasingly important driver of China’s GDP growth through the mid 1990s and early
2000s.
As a result of the rapid expansion of the export sector, per capita income in urban areas more
than tripled from 1995 to 2007 while the disparity between urban and rural incomes widened
considerably: the ratio of urban to rural per capita income increasing from 3.3 in 1995 to 4.3 in
2007. Moreover, the urban consumption rate as a percentage of disposable income dropped from
83% in 1995 to 73% in 2007 indicating that the millions of new urban Chinese workers dramatically
increased their savings rate.11 There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. It may
in part be due to durable goods and housing becoming more important components of consumption
for the urban worker. A second major factor is that consumer credit markets in China are not as
yet as well developed as in the US, limiting the Chinese households ability to smooth consumption.
Purchases of most big ticket durable items like automobiles involve little credit, and even home
purchases involve about 30% down payment. According to a study by Bingxi & Lijuan (2009), the
main lenders to consumers in China are commercial banks; and consumer loans constituted only
about 12.5% of all bank loans in 2007 and 80% of those loans were for housing.12 Finally, the
need to save for retirement given the one child policy and in the absence of a social security system
means that even the less well oﬀ workers need to put money aside. The consequence of the frugality
of the Chinese consumer can be seen from Figure 3: The growth in Chinese savings relative to US
savings has been dramatic. Chinese savings were less than a third of US savings till 2000 but grew
to be 130% of US savings by 2007.
While the US government and US households on balance beneﬁtted from cheap credit, US
workers in industries facing increased competition lose out. This view is supported by the fact that
the share of wages and salaries as a percentage of US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has dropped
to 46% in 2007 from 49% in 2000. Wages and salaries plus proprietors income dropped to 54% of
GDP in 2007 from 57% of GDP in 2000. With about 117 million households in 2007, that drop
in labor share of GDP translates to a drop of $3,600 per household. However, during the same
period, even though income was redistributed from citizen-workers to foreign-workers and owners
of capital, the share of private consumption in the US remained at 70% of GDP. In fact, as seen
from Figure 4, most of the expansion of the US economy during 2002-2007 was driven by household
9The similar transformation from a mainly rural to a urban society in the US took more than 60 years (roughly
from 1860-1920)
10It has also beneﬁtted from a period of generally rapid growth and low unemployment in the US and the West
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s that limited opposition to Chinese oﬀ-shoring and Chinese imports.
11Source: Derived from China Statistical Yearbooks (1995-2008), Table 9-7/10-18.
12In contrast, credit market debt owed by the household sector in the US is comparable in size to credit market
debt owed by the ﬁnancial sector that includes all commercial banks and bank holding companies – the former was
$13.7 trillion and the latter was $16.5 trillion at the end of the 2nd quarter of 2009 (Table L1, Flow of Funds Accounts
of the US). See also Shimek & Wen (2008).
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Figure 3: The ratios of China and US gross national savings (left scale) and nominal GDP (right scale).
Source: Based on data from China National Bureau of Statistics and the BEA. National savings equals gross domestic
investment plus the current-account balance.
consumption with very scant contributions from investment and government consumption.13 This
raises the question as to why annual household consumption did not drop? We return to this
important issue in Section 3 below.
2.2 Current Account Deﬁcits and Capital Flows into the US Housing Market
The export led growth of the emerging economies coincided with a sharp increase in the current
account deﬁcit of the US which ballooned from $124Bn in 1996 ($1,006 per US household) to
$413Bn in 2000 ($3,787 per US household) and $738Bn in 2007 ($6,194 per US household.) To
balance this deﬁcit on the current account, massive capital inﬂows took place. To understand
this pattern in capital ﬂows, one must recall that the Dollar remains the eﬀective reserve currency
of the world. Moreover most commodities are traded in Dollars. The US is therefore a natural
recipient of liquidity from developing and emerging economies wishing to build up their reserves
as a buﬀer against macroeconomic shocks, as well as those maintaining a Dollar peg. In a world
where the dollar is the de facto reserve currency, a net foreign liquidity demand necessarily implies
a commensurate increase in the US current account deﬁcit. This model is sustainable as long as
the demand for reserves is not too large relative to the size of the US economy. It ceases to be
ﬁscally sustainable in the long run if the demand for reserves grows at a much faster rate than the
US economy and becomes “too large” as this will tend to lead to an ever increasing debt burden
as a fraction of GDP.14 This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 5 which shows the dollar denominated
13This is in contrast to the expansion in the 1990s leading up to the dot com crash in which investment played a
much bigger role.
14Although this eﬀect in principle could be oﬀset by an increase in the private savings of US households abroad,
there is little sign of this on the horizon as of this writing.
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Figure 4: Average growth contributions of Net exports, Household consumption, Government consumption
and Investment in China and the US between 1978 and 2007 . Source: World Development Indicators, World
Bank
foreign reserve holdings held by foreign central banks as a fraction of US GDP. The foreign reserve
holdings of US dollars, which had been at less than 11% of US GDP prior to 2000, grew rapidly
after 2002, in fact it almost doubled over the 5 year period from 2002 to 2007.15 Much of the
demand came from the fast growing emerging economies, especially China, which, in aggregate,
no longer can be considered small and whose growing demand for dollar liquidity began to have a
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Figure 5: Foreign holdings of Dollar reserves as a fraction of US GDP. Source: IMF COFER
15This is even more remarkable as the annual US GDP growth over that period averaged almost 3%.
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A large part of the capital ﬂow was initially into US government debt; foreign holding of the
US government debt increased from 18 percent of the total government debt of $5.66 trillion in
December 2000 to 28 percent of total government debt of $9.5 trillion in June 2008. These massive
inﬂows of international reserves from emerging economies like China were largely insensitive to
interest rates and put downward pressure on real interest rates across the maturity spectrum
despite widening US current account deﬁcits.
Current account deﬁcits in and by themselves are of course not necessarily bad, provided the
capital ﬂows that occur to balance those deﬁcits are put to productive use (e.g. infrastructure,
R&D, etc.) The ﬂood of liquidity pouring into the US initially ﬂowed into Treasuries and the
stock market, fueling the tech bubble.16 While the capital inﬂow did help spur innovation in
the technology sector, shareholders did not necessarily beneﬁt since they (on average) overpaid
for their investments, as borne out by the crash of 2000. Much of the beneﬁt of the technology
innovation instead accrued to countries like China (and to a lesser extent, India) whose vast labor
resources became much more accessible to Western companies seeking to reduce cost by outsourcing
of manufacturing and services. China in particular beneﬁted in this respect due to its vast pool of
labor and the greater openness of its special economic zones developed throughout the 1990s with
the initial wave of foreign investment and technology transfer, especially from Japan (with rapidly
appreciating Yen) and Germany. During this period China quickly emerged as the US’s fastest
growing creditor, second only to Japan in size: In 1994 China held $18Bn in US assets (almost
exclusively Treasuries) which grew to $92Bn in 2000 (roughly $72Bn Treasury debt and $20Bn
Agency debt) and $922Bn in 2007 (roughly $466Bn in Treasuries and $376 in agencies with the
balance in corporate debt and equity), almost 25% of China’s GDP.
The dramatic rise in China’s trade surplus with the US should have led to a gradual appreciation
of the Chinese currency relative to the US dollar which would have served to temper the rate of
increase in the US trade deﬁcit. However, the Chinese policy of maintaining the competitiveness
of its export sector kept the Yuan from appreciating against the US dollar through a system of
strict capital controls. As a byproduct, this policy massively increased China’s dollar denominated
reserves. While this strategy allowed the Chinese economy to grow by riding an export boom, it
stiﬂed the growth of domestic household consumption (at least initially). Many economists have
argued that China could have made better use of its savings by investing in real capital domestically
which eventually would lead to an increase in domestic consumption and imports.17 In fact, as seen
16In this respect the new inﬂows were diﬀerent in nature from the Japanese investments of the 1980’s that included
large investments in real assets (e.g. the Rockefeller Center) and outright acquisitions of US ﬁrms that included
Universal Studios. Attempts by Dubai Ports World to take over the management of six US ports in 2006 and China
National Oﬀshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) bid to buy Unocal, the ninth-biggest US oil ﬁrm were stiﬂed by
political pressures.
17“Another factor contributing to our trade imbalance with China is its exchange rate policy and its accumulation of
reserves, even though trade impacts may not be the purpose of this policy. China’s current account surplus, along with
huge capital inﬂows, has created an immense accumulation of reserves $130 billion, the second-highest level in the
world. While comfortable levels of reserves are essential for every economy, especially in the context of recent ﬁnancial
turbulence, the levels China has reached raise questions as to whether continued reserves growth represents an eﬃcient
use of China’s savings, a matter I discussed with China’s leadership when I was in Beijing. China can earn higher
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from Figure 4, consumption played a very minor role in the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy
since the late 1990s (in contrast to the US) with the main drivers of growth being investment and
exports. The Chinese economy is thus extremely exposed to demand shocks from abroad, as we saw
in 2008-9. However, the domestic policy objective of “maintaining social harmony and stability”,
meant that Chinese policy makers were keen to achieve rapid rates of GDP growth while being
wary of inﬂation pressures and spurring too rapid consumption growth concentrated in a few urban
costal areas.18 To the extent that this remains the overriding concern of Chinese policy makers, it
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Figure 6: Change in Chinese holdings of US assets by asset class in US $M.
After the stock market crash of 2000, capital continued to ﬂow into the US but now increasingly
into safer ﬁxed income instruments. The decreasing government ﬁnancing needs and the low
treasury yields made alternative government backed investments, such as GSE mortgage pools,
more attractive due to the spreads these investments initially oﬀered. Figure 6 shows the pattern
of Chinese net acquisitions of US assets over the period 2001-2008. The largest increases were in
corporate (including non-Agency) and Agency debt while equities did not play any signiﬁcant role
until 2007-8. The ﬂow of money into securitized mortgage pools helped drive down the cost of
borrowing and helped create record proﬁts years for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as mortgage
volumes increased.19 With the pool of conforming mortgages limited and the secondary mortgage
spreads on GSE pools diminishing, investment banks set up their own pools of “private label” (non-
returns by investing in real capital than by money market investments. Such a move would not only bolster Chinese
development, it would help increase Chinese imports, helping to moderate China’s external imbalances.”, Robert E.
Rubin, speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, October 27, 1997
18The term “social harmony and stablity” is often used by Chinese politicians, e.g. President Hu Jintao speech to
factory workers in Langfang, Hebei province, May 25, 2008, Xinhua news agency.
19Apart from the guarantee business, the GSEs also beneﬁtted from the demand for agency debt which was used
to ﬁnance their retained investment portfolios, the source of the bulk of their proﬁts in the last years leading up to
the crisis.
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conforming) mortgages providing investors the desired higher yields at seemingly trivial additional
risk. Thus the ﬂow of capital was ultimately funneled into the US housing market leading to the
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Figure 7: Current account balance and change in household indebtedness. All numbers are in US$ per
household. Source: Treasury
To summarize, the sudden increase in labor supply from workers in developing countries because
of globalization should have resulted in signiﬁcant sections of the population in developed countries
experiencing a decline in their living standards as more and more manufacturing and service jobs
are outsourced. However, the ﬂow of cheap liquidity from abroad during this period helped fuel
the housing bubble creating the illusion of wealth among households sustaining the high level of
consumption, thereby masking the real structural changes that were taking place in the world
economy.20,21 We will provide support for this view in the sections that follow.
3 US households
It is a striking empirical fact that per capita consumption in the US grew at a steady rate of roughly
$1,994 per year over the period 1980-1999, but jumped abruptly to approximately $2,849 per year
from 2001 through 2007 (see Figure 8). How was this remarkable increase in consumption ﬁnanced?
The increase happened despite the March-November 2001 recession and subsequent jobless recovery
20Households may of course simply have reacted in a (bounded) rational fashion given a belief that the housing
bubble would last, as predicted by models along the lines of Ludvigson, Steindel, & Lettau (May 2002)
21According to Krugman (2008), empirical evidence of this phenomenon might be very diﬃcult to capture from
the existing data on the trade patterns, and that may explain the why there is not much agreement on this among
academics and regulators.
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which resulted in no signiﬁcant increase in hourly earnings nor in non-farm employment rates. 22
In fact, per capita consumption in excess of wages and salary accruals and proprietors’ income
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Figure 8: Private consumption and total wages incl. beneﬁts (right axis) along with excess consumption
calculated as private consumption less total wages (left axis). All numbers are in 1980 $ per household.
was also roughly ﬂat between 2000 and 2007 with the S&P500 starting at 1,499 in 2000 Q1 and
ending at 1,421 in 2007Q1. The single item in the portfolio of US households which performed
spectacularly well during the period was their heavily leveraged position in real estate: Home
values went through an unprecedented growth spell, almost doubling in value between 2000 and
the peak in early 2007.
Starting in the late 1990‘s the average national home value appreciation went from around 5%
per year to a peak of 15% per year in 2006 before collapsing in late 2007 (see Figure 9). Over the
pre crisis period, the S&P/Case-Shiller home price index went from 100.77 in 2000Q1 to 186.07 in
2007Q1.
Despite this dramatic increase in home values, households on average did not increase their
home equity much, implying that excess consumption (including consumption of larger homes)
absorbed most of the windfall gains. As can be seen from Figure 10, US household residential
leverage (residential mortgage debt as a fraction of residential home value) increased from about
0.42 in 2000 to about 0.52 in 2007. Consistent with this, the US National Housing Survey of owner
occupied housing (c.f. Table 1 in Appendix A) shows that over the same period, the popularity
of reﬁnancing (Table 1, Panel E) and home equity lines of credit in particular (Table 1, Panel A)
grew substantially until the peak of the housing bubble in late 2007.
22Between 2001 and 2003, total non farm employment declined from approximately 132 million to 130 million while
the ratio of employed people to population declined from 64 percent to approximately 62 percent. At the same time,
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Figure 10: Average US household residential levererage computed as total residential mortgage
debt divided by residential home values (primary residence only). Source: FOF, FHFA, OFHEO
The sharp increase in leverage becomes transparent when we measure leverage as the ratio of
debt to wages as seen in Figure 11. The ratio of mortgage debt to wages almost doubled from
about 0.6 to 1.2, with most of the increase occurring during the 2000 - 2007 period23.
Home prices rose sharply during 2000-2007. Whereas it took 20 years for household real estate
value to increase by $72,916 per household – from $36,437 in 1980 to $108,633 (2.4WS) in 2000 –
usual weekly earnings (in constant (1982) USD) remained ﬂat at USD 325.
23Palumbo & Parker (2009). point out that the System National Accounts for the US by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis picks up the increases in the leverage of the household sector, but miss the rise in the US exposure to the





1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Mortgage debt/Wages Total debt/Wages
Figure 11: Average US household residential levererage computed as household debt divided by
wages). Source: FOF, BEA
it took only 7 years for it household real estate value to increase by another $63,558 to $172,197 by
2007. As a multiple of household wages and salaries, household real estate value increased sharply
from 2.4 to 3.1 during 2000-2007, whereas it only increased from 2.1 to 2.4 during 1980-2000.
While home equity rose by 52 cents for every dollar rise in home value between 1980 and 2000,
home equity increased by only 29 cents for every dollar increase in home prices during the 2000-2007
period. This meant that rather than building equity, households withdrew a larger fraction of the
increase in their home equity for consumption purposes, by maintaining a huge debt burden and
consequently being massively exposed to the risk of falling home values, as subsequent events have
borne out.24,25
It is important to note, however, that the behavior of US households during 2000-2007 can
be rationalized if households ﬁrmly believed that past rates of house price appreciation were
24“The accessibility of the mortgage market to a wide variety of households has facilitated the extraction of equity
in home ownership. Close to a fourth of the wealth of U.S. households, as you know, is in the form of equity in
owner-occupied housing. When house prices increase, the level of this wealth–in the form of capital gains–rises, a
substantial part of which is extracted as cash, mainly as a consequence of home turnover. We estimate, based on
a median period of owning a home of nine years, that each home sale since 1995 has averaged roughly $35,000 in
capital gains, implying a total of $150 billion annually for the economy as a whole. This is largely in the form of
unencumbered cash, since, generally speaking, we ﬁnd that the mortgage taken out by the buyer exceeds that of the
remaining balance of the seller by something close to the realized capital gain. In addition, cash is extracted from
unrealized capital gains through the reﬁnancing process. While it is diﬃcult to know precisely, at least a third to
half of homeowners took some cash out when they reﬁnanced their mortgages last year,” Greenspan (1999).
25The danger of easy monetary policy leading to a boom and subsequent bust has been studied as one of the causes
of the Great Depression. von Hayek (1932) and von Hayek (1934) suggest that an abrupt easing of monetary policy
in the US starting in 1927 combined with the reluctance to liquidate unsound ﬁrms successfully postponed what
would have been a mild recession by two years but created the preconditions for the Great Depression. In particular,
Hayek argues that the policy of “easy money” leads to over-investment through “forced savings” leading to severe
real distortions. In the current crisis, this raises the important question: Will the US stimulus package ultimately
ease or prevent the eﬃcient process of liquidation, and hence whether it will further steepen the eventual cost of the
crisis?
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sustainable, and did not realize that they (or their children) would be liable for paying down the
US government external debt eventually.26 Understanding the fundamental forces driving housing
prices is not easy and it is reasonable to assume that US households took home price increases to be
permanent. Suppose households (on average) simply extrapolated prevailing economic conditions
in forecasting the future, and believed that home values would continue to increase and that cheap
credit would continue to be available through easy monetary policy and massive foreign capital
inﬂows. Then the permanent income hypothesis would in fact suggest that households should
increase their consumption today by borrowing extensively against their unrealized housing gains
of tomorrow. In the next section we show, using a stylized rational model of household consumption
portfolio choice, that US households behavior was consistent the belief that the rise in housing prices
was permanent.
3.1 A Stylized Model of Households’ Consumption Choice
We construct a stylized model of household behavior in order to better understand the response
of households’ consumption to a perceived increase in real estate wealth. The permanent income
hypothesis states that households smooth the consumption of anticipated wealth increases over time
while their consumption adjusts contemporaneously to unanticipated wealth changes. Consistent
with this hypothesis, numerous studies have shown that changes in consumption are positively
correlated with labor income and changes in wealth. Although one may think of housing and
ﬁnancial wealth as equivalent, there are a number of reasons to believe that households may respond
diﬀerently to a $1 increase in ﬁnancial assets versus a $1 increase in house prices. As Campbell
and Cocco (2007) point out27, housing is a leveraged asset for the average household and a $1
increase in housing values will act with a multiplier in relaxing a ﬁnancially constrained household’s
borrowing constraint. Financial assets held by households, on the other hand, are typically not
highly levered.28
Consider the following simple model of household behavior where households derive utility
u(Ct,Ht) from consumption of non-durables Ct and housing Ht with prices PC
t and PH
t respectively.
Each period, the household is endowed with one unit of labor income worth Wt and is subject to
26The government’s debt held by citizens wash out in the aggregate, but the external debt can not grow faster than
GDP forever.
27Buiter (2008) argues that there will be no pure wealth eﬀect on consumption from a change in the fundamental
value of house prices, but there will be a wealth eﬀect due to a change in the speculative bubble component of house
prices.
28“... the equity extracted from housing does not fall unexpectedly into the sellers’ laps all of a sudden. People
who own a home likely have a sense of the appreciation in its value over the years. These unrealized gains may be
factored into their long-term planning, and thus may inﬂuence spending on goods and services both well before and
after the home is sold, rendering it diﬃcult for models to capture this inﬂuence. For example, a middle-aged person
who is sitting on a substantial unrealized gain in his or her house, but does not plan to sell for ten years, may still





t+1Ht+1 − Mt+1 = Wt − PC
t Ct − Tt + (1)
(1 + rS
t+1)St + (1 + rH
t+1)PH
t Ht − (1 + rM
t )Mt (2)
where Tt are taxes, St is household net dollar holdings of ﬁnancial assets (other than the risk-
free), Mt is mortgage debt and rS,rH,rM are the nominal returns on ﬁnancial assets, housing and
mortgage debt respectively. In addition, we follow Campbell and Cocco (2007) in assuming that
individual households (denoted here by subscript i) are subject to a ﬁnancing constraint which
must then also hold in aggregate:
Mit ≤ (1 − d)PH
t Hit (3)
St ≥ 0
where d is the minimum down payment (say, 20%).
A non-zero shadow value of the leverage constraint in (3) in the household optimization problem
implies that housing wealth, labor income and ﬁnancial wealth will act very diﬀerently when the
leverage constraint starts to bind for more households. In particular, the results in Campbell and
Cocco (2007) imply that, while we would not expect consumption to react to anticipated changes
in either labor income or ﬁnancial wealth, anticipated changes in housing wealth should lead to
changed consumption behavior for the subset of ﬁnancially constrained households. Unanticipated
changes in all types of wealth, on the other hand, should have the expected immediate eﬀect on
consumption. Since we here deal only with macro-level data, we cannot check these implications
directly but instead rely on a regression speciﬁcation relating changes in consumption to changes in
the three components of the representative household net-worth: Human capital, ﬁnancial wealth,
and (net) housing wealth (t-stats in brackets below each point estimate).29
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Note that in the speciﬁcation (4), we use concurrent wage income but lagged wealth changes. This
can be explained by noting that households, when planning this years consumption, know their
wages but do not know what return the stock and housing markets may bring.30
29Wages are a ﬂow, but we think here of changes in labor income as a proxy for changes in the unobserved human
capital.
30Note: What the optimizing agent framework buys us here (beyond the mere budget constraint) is the fact that
housing wealth is diﬀerent from other types of wealth due to the shadow value of the borrowing constraint and the
fact that housing is both a consumption good and a store of value.
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Notice that our point estimate 8.4% for the wealth eﬀect on consumption due to a change in
real estate net worth is the same as the estimate reported in column I of Table 1 in Case, Quigley
and Shiller (2005) obtained using data on a panel of US states observed quarterly during the 1980s
and 1990s. Figure 12 shows that (4) does a good job in explaining household consumption growth,
consistent with the view that US households in all likelihood were behaving rationally given a belief
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Figure 12: Year on year changes in private consumption are predicted by concurrent wages and lagged
returns on housing and other ﬁnancial assets. All numbers are in US$ per household.
For every $1 in wage increase, 71¢ are spent on increased consumption. The corresponding
numbers for a $1 increase in housing wealth is a 8.4¢ increase in consumption spending, while
other ﬁnancial asset returns have little or no impact on consumption. While our estimate of 8.4¢
of consumption per dollar of real estate wealth appears rather large, note that we estimate the
wealth eﬀect on consumption for other wealth to be negligible – it may be so because it is diﬃcult
to borrow against other wealth, and home mortgage interest is tax deductible.31
Having established the connection between home prices and excess consumption (leading to a
current account deﬁcit), we proceed to examine the association between the current account deﬁcit
and home prices in the next section.
31We ﬁnd that the slope coeﬃcients for the changes in domestic and foreign holdings of government debt are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (results available upon request,) which is consistent with the view that investors
ignore any changes in their ﬁnancial liabilities due to changes in foreign or domestic holdings of government debt
when making consumption decisions.
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4 House Prices and the Current Account Balance
The reaction of the real estate market (and by implication domestic consumption) to the availability
of cheap and easy credit is an important channel we will consider. Denote by BG
t the level of
government debt, by Tgt the tax revenue of the government, by Tht the taxes paid by the households,





t−1 + Tt − Gt (5)
and the current account surplus is given by
CAt = Wt + rS
dtSt−1 − Ct − rM
t Mt−1 − Tht | {z }
household net savings, HHS
+ Tgt − Gt − rG
t BG
t−1 | {z }
Gov’t savings, GS
+ CSt − CIt − PIt (6)
where rS
dt is the dividend and interest income on ﬁnancial assets (including mortgages and govern-
ment bonds), St−1 held by households, and rM
t is the interest rate on mortgage loans, Mt−1 taken
out by households, CSt is Corporate Savings, CIt is Corporate Investments, and PIt is Private
Investments by households.
Since the trade accounts must balance, capital account ﬂows should be equal in magnitude but
opposite in sign of the ﬂows in the current account. Therefore, from the two above equations it
follows that,
−CapitalFlowst = CAt = [(HHSt − PIt) + (CSt − CIt)] − (BG
t − BG
t−1). (7)
We conjecture that to a ﬁrst order, (CSt − CIt) = 0, and (HHSt − PIt) is negative and invested
mostly in housing, contributing to the housing price bubble, i.e., the capital ﬂows into the US helped
build up the housing price bubble and ﬁnance the increase in government borrowing, (BG
t −BG
t−1).
In fact, the household savings rate in 2005 fell to lows not seen since the great depression (see
Figure 17) and also coincided with a period of large and increasing government deﬁcits.
Taking China as our leading example of a country with large excess savings, the story goes as
follows: the Chinese channel their current account surplus into US assets, in particular government
bonds and household mortgages. The supply of Treasury securities, however, is limited, so much
of the excess liquidity is absorbed in the mortgage market, leading to a positive feedback eﬀect
illustrated by the following stylized example:
Suppose households increase consumption by $1 today of which roughly 17¢ are spent on imports
from e.g. China. Due to the high savings rate abroad, suppose 2¢ are channeled back into “safe”
US denominated ﬁxed income assets held by central banks and foreign households. If the supply
of US government bonds is limited, treasury yields will start to drop to the point where foreigners
in search of higher yields will ﬁnd household mortgage debt attractive. That will increase the
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supply of mortgage debt – and in equilibrium result in an increase in the outstanding pool
of home mortgages, in part due to reduction in mortgage interest rates and in part due to
willingness to relax mortgage lending standards. This in turn has a direct wealth eﬀect (lower
payments) and an indirect wealth eﬀect (increased demand for housing leads to house price
inﬂation) which in turn results in higher consumption tomorrow.
As we will see later, a $1 increase in inﬂows due to current account deﬁcit is associated with almost
a $2 increase in home values. The wealth eﬀect (8.4% of increase in home value) will result in an
increase in consumption of 16.8¢ and a consequent increase in imports of about 3¢, i.e., the 4¢ ﬂow
back into the US will result in a 0.67¢ increase in consumption, and a 0.11¢ increase in imports.
For the magnitude of the feedback eﬀect to be much larger and signiﬁcant, the share of imports in
the increased consumption has to be much higher due to the change in the nature of the basket of
goods consumed, and a majority of the households must be liquidity constrained, resulting in US
households substantially leveraging their housing wealth for consumption purposes through home
equity lines of credit.
To test this feedback from current account deﬁcits to mortgage markets, we consider three
regression equations estimated using annual data for the period 1980 - 2007.
First we examine the impact of the current account balance (CAt−1) on the growth (change)
on the pool of Agency and private label residential mortgage pools (∆MPt). We expect to see the
growth in outstanding mortgage pool increase in response to an increase in the current account
deﬁcit (i.e., decrease in current account balance) with a one year lag to allow for transactions to
take place. We also add the contemporaneous change in treasury issuance since it is exogenous










adj.R2 ≈ 91% (8)
We ﬁnd that almost the entire dollar increase in current account balance goes towards increasing
the pool of outstanding Agency and private label mortgages. As can be seen from the Figure(13),
the regression captures some of the turning points in the growth rate in the mortgage pool.
Second, we examine the change in residential home values (∆PH
t Ht) in response to a change in
the pool of outstanding Agency and private label mortgages (∆MPt) after controlling for the mort-
gage interest rate (rM
t ). The t-statistics of the estimated parameters using Newy-West standard













∆MPt + εt adj.R2 ≈ 77% (9)
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Figure 13: Change in Outstanding Mortgage Pool per HH vs CAB per HH
Again, as can be seen from the Figure(14), the regression captures some of the turning points
in the change in residential real estate values.
To summarize, the evidence is consistent with the view that the capital account ﬂows that oﬀset
the current account deﬁcits were channeled into residential housing and that contributed to the
housing price bubble.32 We will return to this point when we discuss the international evidence
below.
These ﬁndings support the feedback eﬀect: US households consumed more than than their
income because they felt wealthier due to home price appreciation. Excess consumption led to
increase in current account deﬁcit. For accounts to balance, there was a corresponding inﬂow of
foreign capital that was channeled into home mortgages leading to a rise in home prices. That
fueled continued excess consumption and the cycle continued for a while. Figure 15 illustrates that
the size of the current account balance deﬁcit was roughly of the same order of magnitude as the
mortgage origination in the US. We now examine the role of ﬁnancial engineering in channeling
foreign funds ﬂowing into the US into housing.
32This is not inconsistent with Favilukis, Ludvigson & Nieuwerburgh (2010) who show that a two sector general
equilibrium model with housing, when calibrated to match the increased foreign ownerhsip of US Treasury debt due
to ﬁnancial market liberalization, can generate large increases in housing prices as observed during the 2000-2007
period in the US.
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Figure 14: Change in residential real estate value vs change in outstanding mortgage pool and mortgage
interest rate
4.1 The Role of Financial Engineering
Wall Street and ﬁnancial engineering played an important role in facilitating what was already a
crisis in the making, as described in Sections 2 and 3. With US current account deﬁcits reaching
record levels, foreign savings were ﬂowing into the US and especially ﬁxed income markets lowering
yields on Treasuries and sending investors looking for higher yielding low risk alternatives such
as mortgage backed securities (MBS).33 Financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage spurred by
the excess demand for low risk investments created the securitized banking system (a.k.a. shadow
banking system) in which intermediaries originated/acquired mortgages for the explicit purpose
of creating “diversiﬁed” pools of assets that could be ﬁnanced by short term debt and sold on to
investors. 34 A second consequence was the increased rehypothecation of assets in high demand that
was facilitated by very low margin requirements given the low risk of the underlying assets. This
set the stage for a leverage cycle as discussed by Geanakoplos (2009). While the “rehypothecation”
and staggering amounts of leverage available in repo markets arguably played an important role in
the propagation and ampliﬁcation of the housing bubble, it itself was only made possible by the
ample supply of “real” money that both bought the mortgages and supplied the leverage used by
the intermediaries in creating the pools.
The diversiﬁcation logic of the credit rating agencies (largely based on the fact that the US had
33See Boyd, Jagannathan and Kwak (2009) for a discussion.
34See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft & Boesky (2010) for an excellent overview.
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Figure 15: Size of current account deﬁcit relative to housing market. Panel (a): Ratio of current account to
estimate of mortgage origination associated with home sales (estimate based on total number of home sales
and average mortgage debt per homeowner). Panel (b): Ratio of current account balance to total value of
existing and new home sales. Source: FHFA
not seen a nationwide house price collapse since the Great Depression), allowed for the creation of
seemingly risk-free assets by tranching pools of risky individual mortgages, the so called “private
label” Asset Backed Securities.35 While the private label ABS market had steadily increased in
market share throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, it really took oﬀ at the end of the 2001-03
recession reaching a market share of around 50% by the end of 2006, as seen in Figure 16. As
production of AAA rated securities was ramped up, there was a lack of good quality mortgages to
securitize, leading to the erosion of underwriting standards, as discussed by Foote, Gerardi, Goette
& Willen (2008). Figure 16 the rapid increase in risky sub-prime, alt-A and home equity mortgages
coinciding with the explosion in private label ABS.
With rising housing prices and low rates on alternative investments, investors were tempted
to reach for higher subprime yields, ignoring the potential for hitherto unseen levels of delinquen-
cies down the road. The collective failure to internalize low probability aggregate risk distorted
incentives and created the fragility as agued by Gennaioli, Shleifer & Vishny (2010).
To summarize, ﬁnancial engineering greatly expanded the capacity of the US housing market
to absorb the money that was ﬂowing into the US at increasing rates, thereby allowing households
to achieve record high levels of leverage, as seen in Figure 11 and 10. Although real estate values
went up by $10,037 per household from 2004-7, the average home equity actually fell by $10,566
over the same period, indicating that households, on average, were cashing out even faster than
35Prior to 1990, the Agency mortgage pools, consisting of conforming (e.g. 30 year ﬁxed rate, ≤$417K, ≥80%
Loan-to-Value) ﬁrst lien mortgages, were pretty much the only game in town when it came to mortgage backed
securities, with private label issues playing only a relatively minor role (see Figure 16). During the late 1990’s a
ﬂurry of innovation took place in the mortgage industry, with new mortgage types being created which allowed
homeowners to take bets on mortgage rates and enabled otherwise unqualiﬁed buyers to qualify for mortgages by
deferring payments. These non-conforming mortgages were securitized through so-called “private label” Asset Backed
Securities (ABS) sponsored by Wall Street.
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Figure 16: Panel a: Outstanding mortgage backed securities by issuer in US$ per household. Panel b:
Origination of non-prime mortgages in US$M. Source: FHFA & Federal Reserve
house prices went up. The explosion in private label ABS also coincided with an equally remarkable
deterioration in the current account, as seen in Figure 7. At the end of 2006, subprime and alt-A
loans accounted for roughly 72% of ARM debt outstanding - that is roughly $2.5 trillion in debt,
or 25% of the total mortgage debt outstanding. This represents about 9.6 million loans, or roughly
19% of the total number of mortgage loans outstanding. The money ﬂowing into the housing
market led to the housing price bubble: The S&P Case - Shiller home price index increased from
100.77 in 2000 Q1 to 186.07 in 2007 Q1, i.e., an increase of 86%.
4.2 The Role of the Government
Certain actions taken by the US government and its agencies during the 2001-2007 period have
been suggested as contributing factors in the buildup to the ﬁnancial crisis.
While ﬁscal policy may have played some role in laying the ground work for the ﬁnancial crisis,
it was less important than the behavior of the private sector and households. During mid 80s,
government deﬁcits were around 4.5%, larger than the Balance of Payment deﬁcits which were
around 3.25%. Since the capital ﬂows into the country that were needed to oﬀset the current
account deﬁcits were smaller than the government deﬁcits, part of the government deﬁcits were
oﬀset by net domestic private sector savings, i.e., the private sector accounted for a net surplus of
capital ﬂows. In fact, even personal savings as a percentage of personal income started falling only
after 1984 (see Figure 17). This had changed dramatically starting in the late 90’s. By 2006, the
federal deﬁcit was around 2.5% and dwarfed by the current account deﬁcit of around 6%, the result
of a decade of net capital inﬂows. In other words, while the government deﬁcit is clearly important,
it was not the main driver of capital inﬂows during the buildup to the recent crisis.36
36Ever since the ﬁrst income tax was introduced in the US in 1894, interest expenses have been deductible with
the original logic being that most interest expenses were associated with the running of farms and businesses. The
deduction eﬀectively treats mortgage interest as a business expense thereby allowing homeowners to deduct it from
taxable income. However, whereas a business must pay tax on the net income with which the interest expense was
incurred, homeowners do not pay tax on the imputed rental value of their own home. The mortgage interest deduction
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Figure 17: The personal savings rate of US households. Source: BEA
The stance of monetary policy during the post recession 2002-2005 period was arguably very
accommodative with the real short rate in negative territory during much of the period. Combined
with a steep slope of the yield curve, it no doubt provided an incentive for homeowners to shift into
riskier ARMs and for investors to ﬁnance short and invest long. While the low level of the policy
rate may have played a role in the channeling funds into home mortgages, it can hardly be blamed
for the poor quality of the subprime mortgages originated with much of the expansion coming from
the subprime and Alt-A segments. Moreover, it is diﬃcult to make the direct link between the
level of the fed funds rate and house prices given that the rate of house price increases accelerated
sharply in 2005 and 2006 long after the fed had started tightening substantially.
Arguably the most direct way in which government policies helped spur the housing bubble
was through the aﬀordable housing mission given to the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by Congress in 1992 in order to expand housing opportunities for
low- and moderate-income families. In a nutshell, the basic business model of these GSEs consisted
of two lines of business. The ﬁrst, was the securitization and guaranteeing of conforming prime
mortgages which required a relatively low level of capital reserves (2.5% was mandated) given the
high quality of collateral (the federal government providing the ultimate tail risk insurance). The
second line of business was the retained portfolio of investments in MBS which was allowed under the
charter as long as the tranches purchased satisﬁed the 80% LTV requirement. The GSEs could not
guarantee subprime mortgages directly in order to fulﬁll their aﬀordable housing mandate. Instead
they were allowed to purchase ostensibly safe tranches of private label MBS securities backed by
subprime mortgages and count these investments toward their obligations to lend to lower-income
home buyers. In addition both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought huge amounts of Alt-A and
under US tax law therefore represents a subsidy to the housing market, but cannot hardly be blamed for a bubble
occurring a century later.
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option ARM mortgages (although these did not count toward their HUD requirements) at very
attractive spreads to their near treasury cost of funding. In fact, the majority of the proﬁts made
by the GSEs in the years leading up to the crisis came from the retained portfolio (arbitraging the
implicit tax-payer guarantee of agency debt) rather than the core guarantee business. The ability
to lever up 40 times, meant that the GSEs’ retained portfolios (much of it subprime) quickly grew
to gigantic proportions and on the eve of the crisis in 2007 the GSEs, with more than a trillion
dollars in their retained portfolios, were the single largest subprime investors.37
4.3 Why Did the Bubble Burst?
The remarkable economic growth in emerging nations was associated with a rapid increase in
prices of intermediate production goods and especially commodities, with the Goldman Sachs
Commodities index more than quadrupling between 2002 and the peak in early 2008. While the
wages of the median US worker grew modestly, and in line with the core CPI, over the same period,
the volatile food and energy components of the CPI started growing at an accelerated rate in late
2003 through early 2008 (see Figure(18)). This caused trouble for many subprime home owners
with high back-end debt-to-income ratios for whom food and energy take up a signiﬁcant share of
disposable income. By mid 2007, many subprime households were eﬀectively left with the choice
between ﬁlling their trucks and fridges or paying their mortgages which lead to a steep rise in
90+ day delinquency rates for the 2005-2007 vintages which arguably had the worst underwriting
standards. Interestingly many defaults started occurring within 12-18 months of origination, well
before the reset date of subprime ARMs, indicating that the cause in many cases was related to a
cash ﬂow problem rather than just the inability to reﬁnance after the initial teaser rate reset (see
Figure (19)).38
As subprime households started to default on their loans, downward pressure on house prices
resulted due to foreclosures. Spreads on MBS tranches started blowing out putting subprime
originators in trouble, leading to the Bear Stearns hedge fund collapse in 2007, and forcing banks
to bring more of the MBS exposure onto their balance sheets. The resulting funding problems
at subprime and Alt-A lenders led to an increase in the number of disqualiﬁed borrowers due to
tightened credit standards and “disintermediation” (see Figure 20) . Repricing of risk in the market
in combination with the declining value of their collateral also dried up the availability of new teaser
rate loans to home owners with existing ARMs, leading to further self-reinforcing waves of loan
defaults.39
Sophisticated investors who saw signs of events that could trigger the collapse of the housing
37In the aftermath of the crisis, a large number of articles have been written on the the role of GSEs, see e.g.
Wallison & Calomiris (2009) for an early discussion.
38See Haughwout et al (2008) for a detailed discussion of the early delinquency phenomenon which is otherwise
hard to reconcile with other macro economic shocks or strategic defaults by households.
39Foote, Gerardi, Goette & Willen (2008) found that over 60% of subprime originations prior to 2004 were reﬁnanced
within 2 years. In their sample , the initial two-year rate was 7.3% in 2004, rising to 8.5% in 2006 while the
corresponding prime ARM rates were 3.9% in 2004, rising to 5.5% in 2006. By comparison, the corresponding fully
indexed ARM rates were 11.5% and 9.1%.
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Figure 18: Core Consumer Price Index (excl. food & energy), the food & energy component of the CPI,
and the median hourly wages of all employed older than 25 years. All numbers are quarterly and indexed to
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Figure 19: Cumulative serious delinquency percentage rates (90 days+) for subprime vintages as a function
of months since origination. Source: LoanPerformance
bubble started taking a short position on US housing. Wall Street created ﬁnancial instruments
to meet the demand for shorting the US housing market. In early 2006, the ﬁrst subprime
mortgage backed credit derivative indices were launched (e.g. the ABX.HE index) in order to
allow investors to take bets on the subprime market without holding the underlying asset backed
securities. According to subsequent reporting in the press, investment banks and large hedge funds
started making large leveraged bets against subprime using these newfangled instruments by late
2007. Thus ﬁnancial engineering, which had helped bring about the housing bubble in the ﬁrst
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place, also played an instrumental role in the bursting of the bubble.40
The sub-prime ARM debacle was eerily reminiscent of the experience with the short term
balloon mortgages that were the norm prior to the Great Depression. On such balloon mortgages,
the principal was at most partially amortized at maturity, leaving the homeowner with the chal-
lenge of reﬁnancing the balance at maturity. During the Great Depression, this system of home
ﬁnancing resulted in a lengthy period of foreclosures and defaults as homeowners could not roll over
their mortgages. As a direct consequence of this experience, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) popularized the 30 year ﬁxed rate mortgage in the 1930s as a standardized long-term, self-
amortizing, home loan that allowed homebuyers to lock in ﬁxed, aﬀordable monthly payments over
the entire life of the loan. It allowed generations of Americans to accumulate wealth for retirement
by building equity in their homes. This was yet another lesson from the Great Depression that was
forgotten by the ﬁnancial community by the early 2000s.
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Measures of Supply and Demand for Residential Mortgage Loans
Figure 20: Percentage of loan oﬃcers at major US credit institutions reporting tightening of credit standards
over prior year for residential mortgage loans. Source: Federal Reserve Survey of Loan Oﬃcers
5 Why Housing Bubbles are Diﬀerent
In this section we elucidate why even a relatively modest housing bubble may have more severe
real eﬀects than other asset price bubbles, e.g. a stock market bubble.
5.1 Money Channeled into Housing has a Bigger Price Eﬀect
To understand why money channeled into housing can have a bigger price eﬀect, consider the
following hypothetical economy with 10 households. Each household has $100 in housing wealth
40“Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won”, New York Times December 14, 2009
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and $100 in stocks. Suppose there is a sudden helicopter drop of $10 per household, that each
household has to use in bidding up the prices of stocks or housing.
First, suppose households decide to use the money to bid up the price of stocks. The total
value of stocks before the helicopter drop of money was $1,000. The total value of stocks will go up
by $100, the total amount of money dropped, i.e., an increase in price of 10%. Whether everyone
invests their $10 directly in stocks or nine of the households lend their money drop to the tenth
household which in turn invests the $100 ($90 borrowed plus $10 of its own) in stocks does not
matter. The price eﬀect on stocks will be the same. There is no leverage eﬀect in the aggregate,
since stocks are homogenous.
Next, suppose households decide to invest the money to bid up the price of housing. When
there is no leverage allowed, and each household bids up the price of its own house, the price rise
will be $10/$100 = 10%.
Suppose leverage is allowed. Nine of the households give their money to a bank. The bank
lends the $90 to one household. That household uses that to bid up the price of its house. The
price rise will be $100/$100 = 100%. Other households will also think their house value has gone
up by 100%, since assessors use comparables for home valuation.41 Hence there is leverage even
in the aggregate in housing and there is a money multiplier eﬀect on housing prices. The same
amount of money ﬂowing into housing is likely to cause a bigger price rise. This is consistent with
Piazzesi & Schneider (2009) who show that a small number of optimists can drive up the average
transaction price of houses without a large increase in trading volume or market share.
Like all bubbles the housing price bubble also collapsed eventually. The wealth eﬀect that kept
consumption up vanished. The ﬁnancial intermediaries that channel money into housing were also
highly levered, worsening the situation when the bubble burst. The recession followed.
5.2 A Housing Bubble is Diﬀerent from a Stock Market Bubble
It is interesting to contrast this experience with the even more dramatic (in percentage terms) stock
market collapse in 2000. While the stock market downturn led to the shallow recession of 2001,
the collapse of the housing bubble has led to a much more severe recession now.42 While the real
eﬀects of the recession following the stock market collapse were largely ameliorated by the highly
accommodative monetary policy which saw the federal funds rate lowered from 5.31% in March
2001 to 2.09% in November 2001, it can not explain the severity of the recession we are facing now.
A crash in the value of home values has a far more severe impact on the economy than a
41Unlike stocks, houses are illiquid with few transactions relative to the number of homes in the economy. As
Piazessi and Schneider (2009) observe, less than 6% of owner occupied houses are traded during a typical year
whereas the annual trading volume for stocks in the NYSE is about 120%. In view of that the common practice is
to value houses by examining the price at which a similar comparable house transacted recently.
42That the bursting of real estate bubble, unlike the bursting of the stock market bubble, can have disastrous
consequences is well recognized by economists. For example, Franklin Allen, in his keynote address at the 8th Asia
Paciﬁc Finance Conference held in Bangkok (July 22-25, 2001), cautioned that the bursting of the real estate bubble
might lead to a long recession in the US just like that in Japan.
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corresponding decline in the value of stocks for the following reasons.
Residential real estate constitutes a substantial part of household wealth for most households.
For the middle three wealth class quintiles of the population, the principal residence constituted
66.1% of the value of the total household assets, whereas corporate stocks and ﬁnancial securities
constituted only 7.9% (cf. Table 7, Wolﬀ (June 2007)). In 2004, 48.6% of all families held stocks,
with a median value $24,300. In contrast, 67.7% of all families owned their primary residence, with
a median value of $131,000.43
Investment in housing typically involves leverage, whereas there is relatively little leverage in
stock investments. For example, mortgage debt was about 47.4% of residential real estate value in
2004 whereas other debt was only 6.8% of the value of the other assets of households. Averages
understate the leverage available for investing in residential homes. For example, 51% of all loans
that originated in 2006 had a CLTV (combined loan to value ratio) of more than 80%; 29% of
originations in 2006 had a CLTV of more than 90%.44
Residential real estate being a large fraction of the total assets of households together with
the fact that households can and do use real estate as collateral to borrow against implies that
a perceived increase in household wealth will result in a large increase in aggregate consumption.
That view is consistent with the estimates in equation (3): a $100 increase in housing wealth
is associated with a $8.40 increase in consumption. In contrast there is hardly any increase in
consumption due to increased stock market wealth. The corollary is that bursting of the housing
price bubble will have a far severe adverse impact on consumption.
Recovering from a recession often involves households moving to another location so that the
skills of agents in the economy are better matched to demands for those skills. However, the
recovery will be made more diﬃcult when the recession is associated with a collapse of housing
prices. That is because moving involves selling the current home and using the equity released
from that sale to buy another home in a diﬀerent location. When the equity in the home has been
lost, selling a home and moving becomes diﬃcult. To understand why, consider a hypothetical open
economy with two agents, a and b. Agent a lives and works in location A and b in location B. Each
lives in a house valued at $100 and a mortgage debt of $80. There is an unanticipated technology
shock that makes the skills of each agent not relevant in their respective locations. However, if A
moves to B and B moves to A, they can maintain their productivity and their jobs. If the housing
values remain the same, each can sell their house to the other (through an intermediary,) payoﬀ
the loan, take a new loan for the same amount, and move. Suppose, instead the housing values
drop to $80 and that the banks require a minimum equity of 20%. In that case, if they cannot sell
their houses – their equity has been wiped out. Because they cannot relocate, they cannot recover
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Figure 21: Panel a: Current account balances as percentage of GDP. Panel b: House price index,
percentage change from previous year adjusted for consumer price inﬂation. Source: OECD Economic
Outlook 2008
5.3 The US is not Alone: Some International Evidence
A number of other developed countries experienced a period of current account imbalances and
anemic personal savings rates similar to the US. Interestingly, many of these countries running
signiﬁcant CA deﬁcits also have had a housing bubble and a subsequent crash. By contrast, CA
surplus countries did not have housing price bubbles as illustrated by Germany and Japan in Figure
21. Similarly to the US, the countries that ran CA deﬁcits will now face the task of stimulating
their economies while credibly promising to impose the ﬁscal discipline down the road necessary
to paying oﬀ their debts in the future. This will be the more challenging without the beneﬁt of
having the world’s reserve currency at their disposal. The peripheral European countries will not
have the option of simply printing money and, in the UK, the painful runs on the British pound
in 1992 is still fresh in memory.
6 Conclusion
The common wisdom is that cheap money and lax supervision of ﬁnancial institutions led to this
ﬁnancial crisis, and solving that crisis will take us out of the recession. We argue that the ﬁnancial
crisis was just the symptom. The fundamental cause of the crisis is the huge labor supply shock
the world has experienced, that led to the glut in liquidity and money supply through the various
channels discussed in this paper. Some have argued that global imbalances did not cause the
increased leverage and the real estate bubble, but that they were important co-determinants. In
our view, the need to accommodate the huge labor supply shock led to the economic policies
followed by a number of countries in the 2000s that caused the distortions described by Obstfeld
43Cf. Bucks, Kennickell & Moore (2006)
44Anatomy of a Credit Collapse, Conﬁdential Kellogg Presentation, Amitabh Arora, December 2007.
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and Rogoﬀ (2009) and others.
Our analysis suggests that for recovery to take place the structural imbalances in global capital
ﬂows need correction, in part through policy and institutional changes that promote higher saving
in developed countries and capital ﬂows into developing nations. Policies that promote households’
understanding of the burden of the public debt in the US and European countries would contribute
to higher national savings rates. The value of the US dollar may have to decline substantially, or
the wages of Chinese workers engaged in export related activities will have to rise sharply, and
alternative reserve currencies may have to emerge to stop the ﬂood of capital into the US. As we
have argued, it is not sustainable to have the demand for dollar reserves grow much faster than the
US economy indeﬁnitely as the US accounts for a smaller and smaller share of the world economy
in the future.
The macro forces triggered by the labor shock is like a tidal wave that needed to wash ashore
no matter what. History might have taken an entirely diﬀerent path with better risk management
controls in place in the US but then again, ﬁnancial innovation might just have found a diﬀerent
way of getting highly leveraged deals done oﬀ-shore or through creative accounting.45 However,
none of these macroeconomic considerations negate the need for the development of improved
risk management in the broadest sense in order to ensure ﬁnancial stability and prosperity going
forward.
The return home of millions of World War II veterans increased the US labor force of about 60
million workers by almost 25% within a very short period of time. At that time the Department
of Labor, which certainly had no cause to accentuate the negative, predicted that 12 to 15 million
workers would be unemployed.46 That did not happen! That problem was managed well leading
to prosperity instead of doom, thanks in no small part to the GI Bill and other governmental ﬁscal
intervention. We believe that our analysis provides some new insights regarding the causes of the
recession that will be helpful in managing this crisis well. The housing bubble created the illusion
of wealth. In 2007 residential real estate was 1.45 times GDP. Suppose housing values have to
drop by 25% to reach their fundamental levels of value. The impact on consumption given our
estimate of 8.4% as being the wealth eﬀect will be 1.45 × 0.25 × 0.084 = 3%. The economy should
be able to recover from there and move on its normal growth path with the right policies in place.
For example, in the US, institutions that allow households to reduce their debt burden without
going through a complex and lengthy bankruptcy process would promote relocation of resources
and speed up economic recovery.
China and India will continue to need to bring tens of millions of rural laborers into the
productive workforce in the coming decades and the world economy must ﬁnd a sustainable way of
dealing with this inﬂux. As China’s rapid rate of growth continues, its export led growth strategy
of the past cannot go on indeﬁnitely and China’s domestic consumption will eventually have to
45Reminiscent of when Regulation Q gave rise to the Euro dollar market in the 1970s, or how a wide array of
investment vehicles are not covered in the Basel II risk accounting.
46Richard Severo and Lewis Milford (1989), Sweet Wine At Last, The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Winter
1989.
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grow as a share of GDP. At the same time, Western economies will necessarily have to adjust to
a new equilibrium in which commodities are scarcer and households face stiﬀer competition for
jobs. In the new equilibrium the world will have hundreds of millions of new “middle class” citizens
with increased appetites for consumption of commodities and use of scarce natural resources. As
a result, not only exchange rates, but also relative prices must be allowed to adjust accordingly,
beneﬁtting those countries who see their terms of trade improve.
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Table 1: Selected mortgage characteristics of US owner occupied residential housing.
Source: US Census Bureau National Housing Survey.
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Total Occupied Units (Thousands) 71,708 72,238 74,931 75,647 76,428
Panel A: Mortgages Currently on Property1
None, owned free and clear 36% 35% 33% 33% 32%
Reverse mortgage 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Regular and/or home-equity mortgage2 62% 63% 65% 64% 66%
Regular mortgage 58% 59% 60% 60% 61%
Home-equity lump-sum mortgage 7% 5% 6% 5% 5%
Home-equity line of credit 9% 10% 13% 13% 12%
Line of credit not reported, no regular or lump sum 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Panel B: Number of Regular Mortgages and Home-Equity Mortgages
1 mortgage 45% 46% 45% 44% 46%
≥2 mortgages 13% 12% 16% 17% 15%
Number not reported 6% 7% 6% 7% 7%
Panel C: Payment Plan of Primary Mortgage
Fixed payment, self-amortizing 79% 80% 77% 77% 79%
Adjustable rate mortgage 4% 4% 5% 5% 4%
Other 3% 2% 3% 3% 2%
Not reported 9% 10% 9% 10% 10%
Panel D: Payment Plan of Secondary Mortgage
Units with two or more mortgages (Thousands) 5,341 4,234 5,286 5,777 5,520
Fixed payment, self-amortizing 84% 80% 74% 82% 82%
Adjustable rate mortgage 3% 4% 9% 7% 7%
Other 9% 8% 10% 7% 7%
Not reported 4% 8% 8% 4% 4%
Panel E: Reason Primary Mortgage Reﬁnanced
Units with a reﬁnanced primary mortgage2 (Thousands) 11,024 16,595 17,685 15,087 12,220
To get lower interest rate 80% 90% 87% 74% 76%
To reduce the monthly payment 3% 2% 25% 11% 13%
To increase payment period 12% 12% 3% 1% 1%
To reduce payment period 2% 1% 11% 5% 5%
To renew or extend a loan that has fallen due 14% 12% 1% 1% 1%
To receive cash 13% 8% 13% 15% 13%
Other reason 0% 0% 9% 12% 14%
Panel F: Percent of Primary Mortgage Reﬁnanced Cash Used for
Home Additions, Improvements, or Repairs
Received reﬁnance cash (Thousands) 1,560 1,925 2,375 2,209 1,587
Zero percent 41% 41% 39% 39% 41%
1 to 99 percent 26% 27% 32% 37% 28%
100 percent 23% 24% 23% 19% 27%
Not reported 10% 9% 5% 5% 5%
1Regular mortgages include all mortgages not classiﬁed as home-equity or reverse.
2Figures need not add to total when more than one category may apply to a unit.
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